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Bandit Problems
Introduction The multi-armed bandit problem, originally described by
Robbins (1952), is a statistical decision model of an agent trying to optimize
his decisions while improving his information at the same time. In the multi-
arm bandit problem, the gambler has to decide which arm of K different
slot machines to play in a sequence of trials so as to maximize his reward.
This classical problem has received much attention because of the simple
model it provides of the trade-off between exploration (trying out each arm
to find the best one) and exploitation (playing the arm believed to give
the best payoff). Each choice of an arm results in an immediate random
payoff, but the process determining these payoffs evolves during the play
of the bandit. The distinguishing feature of bandit problems is that the
distribution of returns from one arm only changes when that arm is chosen.
Hence the rewards from an arm do not depend on the rewards obtained from
other arms. This feature also implies that the distributions of returns do not
depend explicitly on calendar time.
Practical examples of the bandit problem include clinical trials where dif-
ferent treatments need to be experimented with while minimizing patient
losses, or adaptive routing efforts for minimizing delays in a network. In
an economics environment, experimental consumption is an example of in-
tertemporal allocation problems where the trade-off between current payoff
and value of information plays a key role. Alternatively, the use of arms may
change their physical properties as in learning by doing where experience
with the arm increases its future payoffs.
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Basic Model It is easiest to formulate the bandit problem as an infinite
horizon Markov decision problem in discrete time with time index t = 0, 1, ....
At each t, the decision maker chooses amongst K arms and we denote this
choice by at ∈ {1, ..., K}. If at = k, a random payoff xkt is realized and
we denote the associated random variable by Xkt . The state variable of the
Markovian decision problem is given by st.We can then write the distribution
of xkt as F
k (·; st) . The state transition function φ depends on the choice of
the arm and the realized payoff:
st+1 = φ
(
xkt ; st
)
Let St denote the set of all possible states in period t. A feasible Markov
policy a = {at}∞t=0 selects an available alternative for each conceivable state
st, i.e.
at : St → {1, ..., K}
The following two assumptions must be met for the problem to qualify
as a bandit problem.
1. Payoffs are evaluated according to the discounted expected payoff cri-
terion where the discount factor δ satisfies 0 ≤ δ < 1.
2. The payoff from each k depends only on outcomes of periods with
at = k. In other words, we can decompose the state variable st into K
components
(
s1t , ..., s
K
t
)
such that for all k :
skt+1 = s
k
t if at 6= k,
skt+1 = φ(s
k
t , xt) if at = k,
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and
F k (·, st) = F k
(·; skt ) .
Notice that when the second assumption holds, the alternatives must be
statistically independent.
It is easy to see that many situations of economic interest are special
cases of the above formulation. First, it could be that F k
(·; θk) is a fixed
distribution with an unknown parameter θk. The state variable is then the
posterior probability distribution on θk. Alternatively, F k
(·; sk) could denote
the random yield per period from a resource k after extracting sk units.
The value function V (s0) of the bandit problem can be written as follows.
Let Xk
(
skt
)
denote the random variable with distribution F k
(·; skt ) . Then
the problem of finding an optimal allocation policy is the solution to the
following intertemporal optimization problem:
V (s0) = sup
a
{
E
∞∑
t=0
δtXat (satt )
}
.
The celebrated index theorem due to Gittins and Jones (1974) transforms
the problem of finding the optimal policy into a collection of k stopping
problems. For each alternative k, we calculate the following index γk
(
skt
)
,
which only depends on the state variable of alternative k:
mk
(
skt
)
= sup
τ
{
E
∑τ
u=t δ
tXk
(
sku
)
E
∑τ
u=t δ
t
}
, (1)
where τ is a stopping time with respect to {skt }. The idea is to find for
each k the stopping time τ that results in the highest discounted expected
return per discounted expected number of periods in operation. The Gittins
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index theorem then states that the optimal way of choosing arms in a bandit
problem is to select in each period the arm with the highest Gittins index,
mk
(
skt
)
, as defined by ( 1).
Theorem 1 (Gittins-Jones (1974))
The optimal policy satisfies at = k for some k such that
mk
(
skt
) ≥ mj (sjt) for all j ∈ {1, ..., K}.
To get the economic intuition behind this theorem, consider the following
variation on the original problem. This reasoning follows the lines suggested
in Weber (1992). The arms are owned and operated by separate risk neutral
agents. The owner can rent a single arm at a time to the operators and there
is a competitive market of potential operators. As time is discounted, it is
clearly optimal to obtain high rental incomes in early periods of the model.
The rental market is operated as a descending price auction where the fee
for operating an arbitrary arm is lowered until an operator accepts the price.
At the accepted price, the operator is allowed to operate the arm as long as
it is profitable. Since the market for operators is competitive, the price is
such that under an optimal stopping rule, the operator breaks even. Hence
the highest acceptable price for arm k is the Gittins index mk
(
skt
)
, and the
operator operates the arm until its Gittins index falls below the price, i.e. its
original Gittins Index. Once an arm is abandoned, the process of lowering
the price offer is restarted. Since the operators get zero surplus and they
are operating under optimal rules, this method of allocating arms results in
the maximal surplus to the owner and thus to the largest sum of expected
discounted payoffs.
4
The optimality of the index policy reduces the dimensionality of the op-
timization problem. It says that the original K−dimensional problem can
be split into K independent components, and then be knitted together after
the solutions of the indices for the individual problems have been computed,
as in formula (1). In particular, in each period of time, at most one index
has to be re-evaluated, the other indices remain frozen.
The multi-armed bandit problem and many variations are presented in
detail in Gittins (1989) and Berry and Fristedt (1985). An alternative proof
of the main theorem, based on dynamic programming can be found in Whittle
(1982). The basic idea is to find for every arm a retirement value Mkt , and
then to choose in every period the arm with the highest retirement value.
Formally, for every arm k and retirement value M , we can compute the
optimal retirement policy given by:
V k
(
skt ,M
)
, max
{
E
[
Xk
(
sku
)
+ δV k
(
sk+1t ,M
)
,M
]}
(2)
The auxiliary decision problem given by (2) compares in every period the
trade-off between continuation with the reward process generated by arm k
or stopping with a fixed retirement value M . The index of arm k in the state
skt is the highest retirement value at which the decision is just indifferent
between continuing with arm k or retiring with M = M
(
skt
)
:
Mk
(
skt
)
= V k
(
skt ,M
k
(
skt
))
.
The resulting index Mk
(
skt
)
is equal to the discounted sum of flow index
mk
(
skt
)
, or Mk
(
skt
)
= mk
(
skt
)
/ (1− δ).
Extensions Even though it is easy to write down the formula for the Git-
tins index and to give it an economic interpretation, it is normally impossible
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to obtain analytical solutions for the problem. One of the few settings where
such solutions are possible is the continuous time bandit model where the
drift of a Brownian motion process is initially unknown and learned through
observations of the process. Karatzas (1984) provides an analysis of this case
when the volatility parameter of the process is known.
From an analytical standpoint, the key property of bandit problems is
that they allow for an optimal policy that is defined in terms of indices that
are calculated for the individual arms. It turns out that this property does
not generalize easily beyond the bandit problem setting. One instance where
such a generalization is possible is the branching bandit problem where new
arms are born to replace the arm that was chosen in the previous period (see
Whittle (1981)).
An index characterization of the optimal allocation policy can still be ob-
tained without the Markovian structure. Varaiya, Walrand, and Buyukkoc
(1985) give a general characterization in discrete time, and Karoui and Karatzas
(1997) provide a similar result in a continuous time setting. In either case,
the essential idea is that the evolution of each arm only depends on the (pos-
sibly entire) history and running time of the arm under consideration, but
not on the realization nor the running time of the other arms. Banks and
Sundaram (1992) show that the index characterization remains valid under
some weak additional condition even if the number of indices is countable,
but not necessarily finite.
On the other hand, it is well known that an index characterization is not
possible when the decision maker must or can select more than a single arm at
each t. Banks and Sundaram (1994) also show further that an index charac-
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terization is not possible when an extra cost must be paid to switch between
arms in consecutive periods. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2001) consider a sta-
tionary setting in which there is an infinite supply of ex ante identical arms
available. Within the stationary setting, they show that an optimal policy
follows the index characterization even when many arms can be selected at
the same time or when a switching cost has to be paid to move from one arm
to another.
Market Learning In economics, Bandit problems have first been used
to model search processes. The first paper that used a one-armed bandit
problem in economics is Rothschild (1974) in which a single firm is facing
a market with unknown demand. The true market demand is given by a
specific probability distribution over consumer valuations. However the firm
initially has a prior probability over several possible market demands. The
problem for the firm is find an optimal sequence of prices to learn more
about the true demand while maximizing its expected discounted profits.
In particular, Rothschild shows that ex ante optimal pricing rules may well
end up using prices that are ex post suboptimal (i.e. suboptimal if the
true distribution were to be known). If several firms were to experiment
independently in the same market, they might offer different prices in the
long run. Optimal experimentation may therefore lead to price dispersion in
the long run as shown formally in McLennan (1984).
In an extension of Rothschild, Keller and Rady (1999) consider the prob-
lem of the monopolist facing an unknown demand that is subject to random
changes over time. In a continuous time model, they identify conditions on
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the probability of regime switch and discount rate under which either very
low or very high intensity of experimentation is optimal. With a low inten-
sity policy, the tracking of the actual demand is poor and the decision maker
eventual becomes trapped, in contrast with a high intensity policy demand is
tracked almost perfectly. Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) examine the pos-
sibility of mis-pricing in a two-armed bandit problem when the frequency of
change is small. Nonetheless, they show that it is possible that learning will
cease even though the state of demand continues to change.
The choice between various research projects often takes the form of a
bandit problem. In Weitzman (1979) each arm represents a distinct research
project with a random prize associated with it. The issue is to characterize
the optimal sequencing over time in which the projects should be undertaken.
It shows that as novel projects provide an option value to the research, the op-
timal sequence is not necessarily the sequence of decreasing expected rewards
(even when there is discounting). Roberts and Weitzman (1981) consider a
richer model of choice between R&D processes.
Many Agent Experimentation The multi-armed bandit models have re-
cently been used as a canonical model of experimentation in teams. In Bolton
and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) a set of players choose
independently between the different arms. The reward distributions are fixed,
but characterized by parameters that are initially unknown to the players.
The model is one of common values in the sense that all players receive in-
dependent draws from the same distribution when choosing the same arm.
It is assumed that outcomes in all periods are publicly observable and as a
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result a free riding problem is created. Information is a public good and each
individual player would prefer to choose the current payoff maximizing arm
and let other players perform costly experimentation with currently inferior
arms. These papers characterize equilibrium experimentation under different
assumptions on the reward distributions. In Bolton and Harris (1999), the
model of uncertainty is a continuous time model with unknown drift and
know variance, whereas in Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) the underlying
uncertainty is modelled by an unknown Poisson parameter.
Experimentation and Matching The bandit framework have been suc-
cessfully applied to learning in matching markets such as labor and consumer
good markets. An early example of this is given in the job market matching
model of Jovanovic (1979) who applies a bandit problem to a competitive
labor markets. Suppose that a worker must choose employment in one of
K firms and her (random) productivity in firm k is parametrized by a real
variable θk. The bandit problem is then a natural framework for the study of
learning about the match specific productivities. For each k, sk0 is then simply
the prior on θk and skt is the posterior distribution given s
k
0 and x
k
s for s < t.
Over time, a worker’s productivity in a specific job becomes know more pre-
cisely. In the event of a poor match, separation occurs in equilibrium and job
turnover arises as natural by-product of the learning process. On the other
hand, over time the likelihood of separation eventually decreases, as condi-
tional on being still on the job, the likelihood of a good match increases.
The model generates hence a number of interesting empirical implications
which have since been investigated extensively. Miller (1984) enriches the
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above setting by allowing for a priori different occupations, and hence the
sequence in which a worker is matched over time to different occupations is
determined as part of the equilibrium.
Experimentation and Pricing In a related recent literature, bandit prob-
lems have been taken as a starting point for the analysis of division of surplus
in an uncertain environment. In the context of a differentiated product mar-
ket and a labor market respectively, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and
Felli and Harris (1996) consider a model with a single operator and a sep-
arate owner for each arm. The owners compete for the operator’s services
by offering rental prices. These models are interested in the efficiency and
the division of the surplus resulting from the equilibrium of the model. In
both models, arms are operated according to the Gittins index rule and the
resulting division of surplus leaves the owners of the arms as well as the
operator with positive surpluses. In Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996), the
model is set in discrete time and a general model of uncertainty is consid-
ered. They interpret the experiment as the problem of choosing among two
competing experience goods, in which both seller and buyer are uncertain
about the quality of the match between the product and the preferences of
the buyer. In contrast, Felli and Harris (1996) consider a continuous model
with uncertainty represent by a Brownian motion and interpret the model
in the context of a labor market. Both models show that even though the
models allow for a genuine sharing of the surplus, allocation decisions are
surplus maximizing in all Markovian equilibria and each competing seller
receives his marginal contribution to the social surplus in the unique cau-
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tious Markovian equilibrium. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) generalizes
the above efficiency and equilibrium characterization from two sellers to an
arbitrary finite number of sellers in a deterministic setting. Their proof uses
some of the techniques first introduced in Karoui and Karatzas (1997). On
the other hand, if the market consists of many buyers and each one of them
is facing the same experimentation problem, then the issue of free-riding
arises again. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) analyzes a continuous time
model as in Bolton and Harris (1999) but with strategic sellers. Surprisingly,
the inefficiency observed in the earlier paper is now reversed and the mar-
ket equilibrium displays too much information. As information is a public
good, the seller has to compensate an individual buyer only for the impact
his purchasing decision has on his own continuation value but not on the
change in continuation value of the remaining buyers. As experimentation
leads in expectation to more differentiation, hence less price competition, the
sellers prefer more differentiation, hence more experimentation to less. As
each seller only has to compensate the individual buyers, but not all buyers,
the social price of the experiment is above the equilibrium price, leading to
excess experimentation in equilibrium.
Experimentation in Finance Recently, the paradigm of the bandit model
has also been applied in corporate finance and asset pricing. Bergemann and
Hege (1998) and Bergemann and Hege (2005) model a new venture or innova-
tion as a Poisson bandit model with variable learning intensity. The investor
controls the flow of funding allocated to the new project and hence the rate
at which information about the new project arrives. The optimal funding
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decision is subject to a moral hazard problem in which the entrepreneur con-
trols the unobservable decision to allocate the funds to the project. Hong
and Rady (2002) introduce experimentation in an asset pricing model with
uncertain liquidity supply. In contrast to the standard noise trader model,
the strategic seller can learn about liquidity from past prices and trading vol-
ume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such
as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes.
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